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INTRODUCTION 
Ross Compton of Middletown, Ohio, woke in the middle of the 
night as a fire spread through his house.1 Although he knew he had to 
escape, he told the 911 dispatcher that he first collected some personal 
items, packed several suitcases, and threw them out his bedroom 
window before rushing out of the house.2 However, Middletown 
police investigators doubted Compton’s story, in part because the fire 
had started in several locations.3 Compton was in poor health and 
relied on an artificial pacemaker to maintain his cardiac rhythms.4 By 
collecting the electronic data from Compton’s pacemaker—a 
noninvasive procedure that according to the deputy fire chief only 
required Compton to “give [them] his time”—investigators were able 
to see Compton’s heart rate, pacemaker demand, and cardiac rhythms 
around the time of the fire.5 The pacemaker data contradicted 
Compton’s account of the fire, and the judge in Compton’s criminal 
case subsequently allowed the data to be presented against Compton 
during his trial for insurance fraud and aggravated arson.6  
Compton’s case may have been among the first instances of a 
defendant’s medical device data being used against him or her at trial.7 
 
 1. See Motion to Suppress at 2, State v. Compton, No. CR2016-12-1826 
(Ohio Ct. C.P. Butler Cty. May 5, 2017).  
 2. See Karin Johnson, Middletown Man’s Electronic Heart Monitor Leads 
to His Arrest, WLTW5 (Jan. 27, 2017, 8:08 PM), http://www.wlwt.com/article/ 
middletown-mans-electronic-heart-monitor-leads-to-his-arrest/8647942 
[https://perma.cc/UUZ7-V7X7]. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id.  
 5. Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., A Man Detailed His Escape from a Burning 




 6. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, Compton, No. CR2016-
12-1826. 
 7. See Lauren Pack, 2 More Investigations Where Middletown Police Used 
Pacemaker Data, J.-NEWS (July 14, 2017), http://www.journal-
news.com/news/more-investigations-where-middletown-police-used-pacemaker-
data/sfkuYvmupPkVj6vM2MBh0K/ [https://perma.cc/D2VF-PJYZ]. 
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However, in the months since Compton’s arrest, Middletown police 
have sought pacemaker data in at least two separate homicide 
investigations.8 In the words of Middletown Police Lieutenant Jim 
Cunningham, “[e]verybody and everything out there now has a device 
with a lot of information in it.”9 
Medical devices such as cochlear implants and insulin pumps, 
along with wearable technology such as Fitbits and Apple watches, 
measure how people use their bodies.10 In doing so, these devices track 
people’s behavior and, by extension, record their choices throughout 
the day.11 This data is valuable to consumers, medical professionals, 
and even law enforcement.12 The Supreme Court, however, has not yet 
addressed the Fourth Amendment issues surrounding this personal 
health data.13 This Comment analyzes the governing legal doctrines 
for personal health data that is stored locally on a consumer’s device 
and data that is transmitted for monitoring to a third party.14 
Specifically, this Comment argues that society has heightened 
expectations of privacy for this data, and, accordingly, this data should 
be afforded greater Fourth Amendment protections.15 
Part I discusses the health devices in question and how the data 
is collected and transmitted.16 Part II summarizes the governing Fourth 
 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Simon Jary, Fitbit vs Apple Watch, TECH ADVISOR (Dec. 8, 2018), 
http://www.techadvisor.co.uk/feature/wearable-tech/fitbit-vs-apple-watch-2017-
3612954/?p=2 [https://perma.cc/JSL2-NUPN] (describing how the Apple Watch and 
Fitbit track your level of physical activity, your heart rate, and your sleep); see also 
Mary Follette Story, Medical Devices in Home Health Care, in THE ROLE OF HUMAN 
FACTORS IN HOME HEALTH CARE 145 (2010) (ebook) (describing the increasing 
migration of medical monitoring into the home and listing types of home medical 
monitors); Ryan McCreery, Data Logging and Hearing Aid Use, 66 HEARING J. 18, 
18–19 (2013). 
 11. See Jary, supra note 10.  
 12. See Story, supra note 10, at 148 (noting that some users of these devices 
are medical professionals, while others are lay caregivers or the care recipients 
themselves); Wootson, supra note 5 (providing an example of how this data is 
valuable to law enforcement). 
 13. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 547, 552 (2017) (“The Supreme Court has only begun to explore 
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment needs a new digital understanding.”).  
 14. See infra Sections III.A–B (analyzing the threshold question of Fourth 
Amendment protection for both locally stored data and transmitted data). 
 15. See infra Subsection III.B.2 (applying social norms for health and 
medical data to the privacy analysis for transmitted data). 
 16. See infra Sections I.A–B (detailing the types of medical and health 
trackers available, how they collect and store data, and why that data is valuable). 
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Amendment legal doctrines for these devices.17 Part III examines legal 
issues that are unique to these devices and argues that when the data 
is stored locally on a device worn on or in the person’s body, the 
Fourth Amendment should provide protections for this data that is 
coextensive with the protections provided to individuals’ bodies.18 
Finally, it argues that the Court should carve out an exception to the 
third-party doctrine for data that is transmitted to a remote server for 
monitoring.19  
I. MEDICAL AND HEALTH DATA: TRACKING AND PROTECTING 
Continuous outpatient monitoring of patient data promises a 
revolution between patients and their physicians in the modern 
healthcare system.20 Remote telemonitoring by medical professionals 
has various benefits:21 it provides medical professionals with more 
reliable and consistent data versus patient self-reports;22 it empowers 
patients through real-time feedback to adopt healthy behavior 
changes;23 and it decreases healthcare costs by reliably monitoring 
patients away from the hospital.24 At the same time, an increasing 
number of Americans are choosing to monitor their own health and 
wellness, as a majority of Americans now own some form of wearable 
technology like fitness trackers and smartwatches.25 The number of 
 
 17. See infra Part II (describing the two predominant threshold tests in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the trespass test and the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test). 
 18. See infra Section III.A (analyzing the threshold question for locally 
stored data under both the trespass and privacy theories). 
 19. See infra Section III.B (analyzing the threshold question for transmitted 
data under both the trespass and privacy theories). 
 20. See Geoff Appelboom et al., Smart Wearable Body Sensors for Patient 
Self-Assessment and Monitoring, 72 ARCHIVES PUB. HEALTH, Aug. 22, 2014, at 1, 1.  
 21. See id. at 3–6. 
 22. See id. at 3 (describing patient self-reports as “unreliable and inconsistent 
for objective measurements” and providing an overview of clinical applications). 
 23. See id. at 6 (identifying the motivational aspects of health tracking and 
the way that patients “can become empowered to make healthy choices as 
preventative measures”). 
 24. Id. at 3 (“If patients could be monitored reliably away from the hospital, 
this could decrease the cost associated with length of stay (LOS), which can greatly 
decrease healthcare costs and unintended consequences.”).  
 25. Kari Paul, Fitbit May Have Stumbled, but the Wearable Craze Isn’t Dead 
Yet, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-
wearable-craze-isnt-dead-yet-2017-01-31 [https://perma.cc/JX6N-WTK6] (“[T]he 
majority of Americans now own wearables in some form, market research group 
Euromonitor found, including fitness trackers and smartwatches . . . .”). 
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Americans who use wearable technology has increased dramatically 
in a short amount of time; in 2017, wearable fitness trackers and 
smartwatches could be found in 57% of American households, as 
compared to 26% of households just two years prior.26 These medical 
and fitness devices collect data that is attractive to law enforcement, 
and certain the cultural expectations of privacy have become 
connected to this data.  
A. Medical Devices and Their Consumer Counterparts 
Medical devices that record and transmit patient data are 
proliferating.27 Some of these devices aim to enhance doctor–patient 
communication and encourage people with chronic conditions to 
adopt healthy lifestyle changes.28 The monitoring of insulin pumps for 
patients with diabetes, for instance, is one such use.29 In contrast, some 
remotely monitored medical technologies, such as pacemakers, are 
necessary for the survival of the patient.30 Pacemakers are implanted 
under the skin with electrical “leads” that enter the patient’s heart.31 
These devices may use a home monitor that wirelessly receives the 
data stored on the implanted device; the home monitor then sends the 
patient’s data to the physician via a landline, cellular, or wireless 
internet connection.32 The patient may either manually direct his or her 
data to be uploaded using the device’s software interface or the data 
may be continuously uploaded.33 By examining the data from a 
 
          26.     Id.  
 27. See Appelboom et al., supra note 20, at 3–4 (identifying clinical 
applications for cardiovascular monitoring, glucose monitoring, neurological 
monitoring, and physical therapy). 
 28. See id. (noting applications for patients with type one diabetes, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and Parkinson’s disease). 
 29. See Timothy S. Bailey, Diabetes Data Management in the Clinic, 1 J. 
DIABETES SCI. & TECH. 888, 889 (2007) (describing the practical application of remote 
glucose monitoring for patients in a diabetes clinic). 
 30. See Steve Stiles, Remote Device Monitoring Cuts Mortality, Even for 
Pacemakers, MEDSCAPE (May 9, 2014), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/ 
824922 (noting that pacemaker patients with high remote monitoring use had a fifty-
three percent greater survival rate than patients with low remote monitoring use). 
 31. See Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Identified in St. Jude Medical’s 
Implantable Cardiac Devices and Merlin@home Transmitter, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Jan. 9, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Safety Notice], https://www.fda.gov/ 
MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm535843.htm [https://perma.cc/ZU5G-
8NXC]. 
 32. See id.  
 33. See id.  
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patient’s pacemaker, a physician is able to see time-stamped data 
indicating any periods of irregular heartbeats, as well as overall 
cardiac output.34  
Cochlear implants and hearing aids are also medical devices that 
record patient data, logging how much time the user spends in 
different listening environments, such as quiet, noise, or speech in 
noise.35 Moreover, some pharmaceutical companies are developing 
tracking devices that are physically ingested.36 In November 2017, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first “digital pill,” 
a prescription medication embedded with a sensor that will inform 
doctors and family members whether patients have taken their 
medication as prescribed.37 
Outside the medical context, American consumers have also 
demonstrated increasing interest in tracking their own health and 
fitness.38 Around 2007, members of the “quantified-self” movement 
began to promote “self-knowledge through numbers” by using 
technology to track their personal data.39 Members of the early 
quantified-self movement chose to track their steps, diet, sleep, and 
mood, among other metrics.40 In 2008, Fitbit released its first activity 
tracker;41 less than ten years later, 115.4 million wearable devices—
 
 34. See Deanna Paul, Your Pacemaker Can Now Testify Against You in 
Court, WIRED (July 29, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/your-own-pacemaker-
can-now-testify-against-you-in-court/ [https://perma.cc/A6EF-AFEC] (noting that 
data from a pacemaker can reveal heart rate and cardiac rhythms before, during and 
after a suspected crime).  
 35. See McCreery, supra note 10 (detailing clinical applications of this data 
monitoring and how it can affect the patient-provider relationship).  
 36. See Pam Belluck, First Digital Pill Approved to Worries About 
Biomedical ‘Big Brother’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/11/13/health/digital-pill-fda.html?-r=0 [https://perma.cc/8SXV-GKQ7]. 
 37. See id. The first application of this digital pill will be the antipsychotic 
drug Abilify. See id.  
 38. See Paul, supra note 25. 
 39. Gary Wolf, What Is the Quantified Self?, QUANTIFIED SELF (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://quantifiedself.com/2011/03/what-is-the-quantified-self [https://perma. 
cc/AV4A-ZDLZ]; see also Gary Wolf, The Quantified Self, TED (June 2010), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/gary-wolf-the-quantified-self [https://perma.cc/5GVD-
3FR8].  
 40. See What Is the Quantified Self?, supra note 39. 
 41. See Kate Greene, Self Surveillance, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 10, 2008), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/410806/self-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3AFK-RXF5]. 
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including the Fitbit and Apple Watch—were sold worldwide in 2017.42 
Wearable devices may include a GPS sensor to monitor physical 
movement, an altimeter to monitor elevation gain, a heart rate sensor, 
or a skin temperature sensor.43 For instance, the Ava Bracelet—
designed to give the user greater control of her fertility—predicts the 
user’s ovulation based on her body temperature and also tracks her 
sleep, physiological stress levels, and resting heart rate.44 
These devices collect and store data in various ways.45 Some 
devices, such as an insulin pump, store the user’s data locally—on the 
device itself.46 To be shared, an operator must manually share the data 
with an external database; ideally, this data is uploaded from the 
patient’s home just before an office visit.47 Other devices, such as 
pacemakers, may be remotely monitored as the data is continuously 
and automatically uploaded to a third-party database, like the 
Merlin.net Patient Care Network.48 Consumer devices, such as a Fitbit 
or Apple Watch, store the data locally on the device and then sync to 
the user’s phone, tablet, or computer.49 Most Fitbit devices locally 
store minute-by-minute data for seven days and store daily totals for 
up to thirty days.50 Fitbit devices may be set to sync this data every 
time the user opens the Fitbit application on his or her phone or 
periodically throughout the day.51 However, whether health and 
medical data is stored locally or transmitted to a third-party server can 
 
 42. See Forecast Wearables Unit Shipments Worldwide from 2014 to 2022, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/437871/wearables-worldwide-
shipments/ [https://perma.cc/LMU8-2UWR] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 43. See Jary, supra note 10.  
 44. See Ava Women, AVA SCI. INC., http://www.avawomen.com 
[https://perma.cc/6K2L-BP8R] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
 45. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 29, at 889; FDA Safety Notice, supra note 
31 (describing how these devices collect and store data).  
 46. See Bailey, supra note 29, at 889.  
 47. See id. 
 48. See FDA Safety Notice, supra note 31. Pacemakers may also be equipped 
with continuous monitoring via Bluetooth wireless technology. See A Bluetooth-




 49. See How Do Fitbit Devices Sync Their Data?, FITBIT [hereinafter FITBIT], 
https://help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/1877/?l=en_US&c=Topics%3AS
yncing&fs=Search&pn=1 [https://perma.cc/RXA8-XSD8] (last visited Mar. 11, 
2019).  
 50. See id.  
 51. See id.  
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have legal implications.52 And, regardless of how the information is 
stored, consumers, physicians, and law enforcement have found this 
type of data to be increasingly useful.53  
B. Value of Personal Health Data to Doctors, Consumers, and Law 
Enforcement 
The objectivity of tracked medical and health data has made it 
attractive to medical professionals and law enforcement alike.54 
Traditionally, physicians have relied upon a patient’s subjective self-
reporting during an office visit to learn how the patient is doing at 
home or work.55 However, these self-reported outcomes can be 
unreliable and may lack the consistency of objective measurements.56 
Continuous remote monitoring of a patient’s physiological data has 
the benefit of accuracy, although only quantifiable data points can be 
monitored.57 Physicians and patients also value the motivational aspect 
of health monitoring.58 Under this model, patients become more 
informed participants in their health care and are more likely to take 
preventative steps to ensure their health.59 Similarly, many casual 
 
 52. See infra Part III (employing the trespass theory and the reasonable 
expectation of privacy theory to analyze Fourth Amendment protections for locally 
stored and transmitted data). For an example of the locally stored versus transmitted 
data distinction in current government policy, see the June 2017 statement by Acting 
Commissioner for United States Customs and Border Patrol Kevin McAleenan 
specifying that border patrol agents may search data that is locally stored on a device 
but not data that is stored on an external server. See Due Diligence Questions for Kevin 
McAleenan, WASH. POST (June 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
the-switch/files/2017/07/cbp-wyden.pdf [https://perma.cc/GEJ3-5S8J]. 
 53. See infra Section I.B (explaining why consumers, medical professionals, 
and law enforcement value medical and health tracking data). 
 54. See, e.g., Appelboom et al., supra note 20, at 2–6; see also Wootson, 
supra note 5 (providing examples of how this information is useful in both medical 
and law enforcement contexts). 
 55. See Appelboom et al., supra note 20, at 2–3. 
 56. See id. at 3.  
 57. See id. (describing a hybrid model in which the patient is “able to report 
their non-quantifiable variables while still having the ability to monitor quantifiable 
ones”). 
 58. See id. at 1, 6 (“Studies show that a well-informed patient improves 
quality of life and patient outcome because they are more likely to participate in 
healthy behavioral changes.”). 
 59. See id. at 6. 
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users of digital fitness trackers value a degree of accountability and 
motivation from their devices.60 
Law enforcement may also value this data.61 In the case of Ross 
Compton, the data from his pacemaker contradicted his own account 
of the fire that destroyed his home and belongings, and the judge 
allowed the pacemaker data to be entered into evidence against him.62 
Law enforcement also has used data from victims’ devices to establish 
facts in a criminal investigation.63 In Connecticut, police used a 
woman’s Fitbit time-stamped data as a “silent witness” after her 
murder.64 The woman’s Fitbit tracker contradicted the account given 
by her husband, who was ultimately charged with her murder based 
partly on information from the woman’s device.65  
Law enforcement’s access to this information will depend in part 
on the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.66 When the victim or 
suspect consents to the search of his or her data during the course of a 
criminal investigation, Fourth Amendment privacy issues will not 
arise.67 However, Fourth Amendment issues will arise when the victim 
or suspect chooses not to cooperate with law enforcement and does 
not consent to the search of his or her data.68 In these instances, the 
 
 60. See Heidi Godman, Can Digital Fitness Trackers Get You Moving?, 
HARV. HEALTH BLOG (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.health.harvard.edu/blog/can-
digital-fitness-trackers-get-you-moving-201508278214 [https://perma.cc/G55M-
2SNJ].  
 61. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.  
 62. See Wootson, supra note 5; see also Brian A. Jackson, Using Digital 
Data in Criminal Investigations: Where and How to Draw the Line?, RAND BLOG 
(May 15, 2017), https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/05/using-digital-data-in-criminal-
investigations-where.html [https://perma.cc/PQ3K-S5J5]. 
 63. See Christine Hauser, In Connecticut Murder Case, a Fitbit Is a Silent 
Witness, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/ 
nyregion/in-connecticut-murder-case-a-fitbit-is-a-silent-witness.html [https://perma. 
cc/PR97-2WTK].  
 64. Id.  
 65. See id.  
 66. See infra Sections II.A–B for a discussion of the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment.  
 67. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1 (5th ed. 2012). Consent may function “in lieu of obtaining 
a search warrant.” Id. If valid consent is obtained, no probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion is required. See id. § 8.1 n.9. 
 68. See id. § 8.1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment 
protects “against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id. 
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amount of constitutional protection given will depend, in part, on 
social and cultural expectations of privacy for the data in question.69  
C. Protecting Patient Privacy 
For the last fifty years, American cultural expectations of 
privacy have been a prominent factor in courts’ decisions about 
whether to extend Fourth Amendment protection in a given case.70 The 
social norms surrounding personal medical and health information 
indicate that American society has heightened expectations of privacy 
for this data.71 For instance, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) makes it an offense for a person to 
knowingly disclose individually identifiable health information to 
another person.72 The legislative history surrounding HIPAA’s 
passing in 1996 indicates that Congress was acutely aware of 
maintaining the privacy of individual medical and health 
information.73 In the years following the HIPAA legislation, President 
Bill Clinton issued an executive order pertaining to law enforcement’s 
use of protected health information,74 in which he emphasized the 
importance of maintaining patient privacy as the government conducts 
health oversight and other business.75 
The American Medical Association’s (AMA) Code of Medical 
Ethics provides similar evidence of the social norms surrounding the 
privacy of medical and health information.76 The code states that 
 
 69. See infra Section II.B (describing the Court’s consideration of subjective 
and objective expectations of privacy).  
 70. See infra Section II.B (describing the shift in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence toward the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test). 
 71. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (2012). 
 72. See § 1320d-6. An individual may not “use[] or cause[] to be used a 
unique health identifier; . . . obtain[] individually identifiable health information 
relating to an individual; or . . . disclose[] individually identifiable health information 
to another person.” Id. 
 73. See Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996, H. R. 
REP. NO. 104-496, at 100 (1996) (stating in a committee report that “[p]rotecting the 
privacy of individuals is paramount”). 
 74. See To Protect the Privacy of Protected Health Information in Oversight 
Investigations, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,321, 81,321 (Dec. 26, 2000) (stating that the 
government “may not use protected health information concerning an individual that 
is discovered during the course of health oversight activities for unrelated civil, 
administrative, or criminal investigations of a non-health oversight matter”). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS §§ 3.1.1–3.1.5 (2016). 
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protecting patient privacy is a “core value in health care” and is “an 
expression of respect for patient autonomy and a prerequisite for 
trust.”77 Similarly, certain rules governing the admissibility of 
evidence protect communications between a physician and patient, 
and these rules have been vociferously defended in Congress, 
providing further evidence of heightened social norms.78 Taken 
together, HIPAA, the AMA Code of Ethics, and the protections of 
patient–physician privilege illustrate that medical and health 
information are among the areas with the highest social norms for 
privacy protection.79 Today, these devices and the data they collect 
must now interact with the Fourth Amendment, which was drafted 
more than two hundred years ago.80 
II. GOVERNING LEGAL DOCTRINES FOR DEVICE DATA 
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.81 Through this Amendment, the government is limited in 
its ability to surveil its populace.82 The American people expect and 
demand a degree of privacy from their government—a protection that 
facilitates self-expression, personal liberty, practices of religion and 
association, and other freedoms.83  
A Fourth Amendment analysis of police or government conduct 
begins with two questions.84 The threshold question is whether a 
 
 77. Id. § 3.1.1. 
 78. See generally Kenneth W. Graham, Jr. & Ann Murphy, Rejected Rule 
504: Patient’s Privilege, 25 FED. PRAC. & PROC. EVID. § 5521 (1st ed. 2018) 
(discussing proposed changes to rules of evidence that would affect patient–doctor 
confidentiality). 
 79. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (observing our 
“societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from 
government invasion”). 
 80. See Amendment IV: Search and Seizure, NAT’L CONST. CTR., 
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-iv 
[https://perma.cc/KU52-ZJME] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). The Fourth Amendment 
was ratified in 1791. See id. 
 81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated . . . .”). 
 82. See Dale Carpenter, Keeping Secrets, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1098 
(2002). The government “must answer democratically to a polity concerned about 
more than order.” Id. 
 83. See id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 13, at 566. 
 84. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.1 (describing the first step of analysis as 
a determination of whether the government activity constitutes a search or seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).  
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search or seizure, as defined by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, has 
occurred.85 For the Fourth Amendment to apply, the government must 
conduct a search or a seizure.86 If a search or seizure did occur, the 
second question is whether it complied with Fourth Amendment 
standards.87 In other words, the second question asks whether the 
search was “reasonable.”88 In response to the second question, the 
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States ruled that the government’s 
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless the search or 
seizure has been approved by the judiciary or falls within one of the 
exceptions established by the Supreme Court.89  
A. The Threshold Question: Trespass Test  
Contemporary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence contains two 
tests for answering the threshold question of whether a search or 
seizure has occurred: the trespass test and the reasonable expectation 
of privacy test.90 Early jurisprudence framed the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections as property protections against physical intrusion by the 
government.91 In other words, for the Fourth Amendment to be 
triggered, the police must have intruded into a constitutionally 
protected area.92 These protected areas were interpreted as those listed 
in the Fourth Amendment text itself: (1) “persons,” including bodies 
and clothing; (2) “houses,” including apartments and hotel rooms; (3) 
“papers,” such as letters; and (4) “effects,” such as automobiles or 
luggage.93 In the 1928 decision Olmstead v. United States, the Court 
held that placing a wiretap on telephone wires outside of a suspect’s 
home or office was not a search because the government did not 
 
 85. Id. (“Law enforcement practices are not required by the Fourth 
Amendment to be reasonable unless they are either ‘searches’ or ‘seizures.’”). 
 86. See id.; see also Ferguson, supra note 13, at 568. 
 87. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 88. See id.  
 89. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Searches and 
seizures “conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate” are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject to only 
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. 
 90. This Section explores the trespass theory, primarily established by 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928), and recently revived by United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012). The Katz decision and the “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test will be discussed infra Section II.B. 
 91. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.1(a). 
 92. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961). 
 93. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.1(a). 
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physically intrude into a constitutionally protected area.94 This 
reasoning, that a search requires physical intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area, was later superseded by the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test in Katz.95 
Though for many years the trespass test was largely displaced by 
the privacy test established by Katz, the Court revived this physical 
intrusion test in United States v. Jones.96 In Jones, police investigators 
placed a GPS tracking device on the underside of a vehicle registered 
to the defendant’s wife while it was parked in a public lot.97 
Investigators then used the device to track the defendant’s movements 
for twenty-eight days.98 Based in part on the tracking information, the 
defendant was indicted on drug trafficking conspiracy charges.99 The 
Court held that the placing of the GPS tracking device on the 
defendant’s vehicle and its subsequent monitoring was a search for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.100 The Court explained that while the 
Katz decision expanded the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test had not superseded the physical 
intrusion test.101 Therefore, the Court held that when the government 
physically intrudes on a constitutionally protected area in order to 
obtain information, the Fourth Amendment regulates the intrusion.102 
Jones concerned government intrusion into a specific 
constitutionally protected area—the defendant’s automobile, or his 
“effects.”103 The Court’s reasoning from Jones was used again in 
Grady v. North Carolina to support the finding of a government 
intrusion into a different constitutionally protected area—one’s 
 
 94. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465. 
 95. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.1(b). 
 96. See id. § 2.1(e). The Katz decision and the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test will be discussed infra Section II.B. 
 97. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).  
 98. Id. at 403.  
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at 404. 
 101. See id. at 409 (noting that the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis 
has been “added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test”). 
 102. See id. at 407; see also Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Creating a 
“Circle of Trust” to Further Digital Privacy and Cybersecurity Goals, 2014 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 1475, 1503–04 (“[T]hough the majority in Jones concluded that the 
placement of a GPS device on a car violated the Fourth Amendment, this conclusion 
was based on a theory of trespass rather than on a reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
 103. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ 
as that term is used in the Amendment.”).  
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body.104 In Grady, a convicted sex offender was ordered to participate 
in a satellite-monitoring program.105 In this program, Grady would be 
forced to wear a tracking device at all times and be monitored for the 
rest of his life.106 The state argued that the satellite-monitoring system 
did not entail a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
because participants in the sex offender program did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their whereabouts.107 
Relying on Jones, the Court disagreed and applied the trespass test to 
find that the satellite-monitoring system was a Fourth Amendment 
search.108 The Court held that since the government’s program was 
designed to obtain information, and it did so by physically intruding 
on Grady’s body, it constituted a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.109 
Physical searches of the body in order to obtain biological 
material are also held to be Fourth Amendment searches.110 For 
instance, compelled blood tests to determine intoxication trigger the 
Fourth Amendment both by the initial seizure of the person and the 
search that implicates the person’s bodily integrity.111 A search need 
not entail a “surgical intrusion” into the body, such as blood 
withdrawal, as the Court has held that the “deep lung” breaths required 
for a breathalyzer’s chemical analysis are also searches.112 Thus, under 
the physical intrusion theory as revived in Jones, physical searches of 
one’s personal effects or one’s body implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.113 
 
 104. See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1369–70 (2015). “[A] State 
. . . conducts a search when it attaches a device to a person’s body, without consent, 
for the purpose of tracking that individual’s movements.” Id. at 1370.  
 105. See id. at 1369. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 1370. 
 108. See id. The Court also relied on the principle set forth in Florida v. 
Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2013), which held that a search occurred when the police 
gathered information by physically entering and occupying the curtilage of a home 
without the homeowner’s consent. See Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370.  
 109. Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1371 (“The State’s program is plainly designed to 
obtain information. And since it does so by physically intruding on a subject’s body, 
it effects a Fourth Amendment search.”). 
 110. See Ferguson, supra note 13, at 591. 
 111. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See, e.g., Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370 (applying the trespass theory to a GPS 
tracker worn on the body). 
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B. The Threshold Question: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
The Katz decision in 1967 marked a significant shift in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.114 Katz was convicted of gambling and 
wagering offenses in violation of federal law, based in part on 
warrantless recordings of long-distance telephone calls he made from 
a public telephone booth.115 Katz moved to suppress these police 
recordings.116 The Court upheld his motion to suppress because 
although Katz did not have a property interest in the telephone booth, 
he was justified in expecting his conversations there would remain 
private.117 
In Katz, the Court expanded Fourth Amendment protections 
beyond the established constitutionally protected areas, holding that 
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”118 The Harlan 
concurrence, which the Court subsequently adopted,119 set forth a two-
part rule.120 In order for a search to trigger Fourth Amendment 
protections, a person must have exhibited a subjective expectation of 
privacy, and that expectation must be one that society recognizes as 
reasonable.121 In contrast, the Fourth Amendment does not protect that 
which an individual “knowingly exposes” to the public.122  
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court clarified that a Fourth 
Amendment search may occur without any physical intrusion at all.123 
Kyllo involved the use of thermal imaging to detect areas of heat 
emanating from a house because increased or unusual heat output may 
be evidence of an indoor marijuana-growing operation.124 The Kyllo 
Court used the reasonable expectation of privacy test to hold that the 
 
 114. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.1(a) (describing the Katz decision as 
“landmark” and “seminal”). 
 115. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 116. See id.  
 117. Id. at 351–52 (“[W]hat he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”). 
 118. Id. at 351. 
 119. Justice Harlan’s test was adopted by the majority in Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 120. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.1(b); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
 121. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Schlossberg 
v. Solesbee, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (D. Or. 2012) (holding that a suspect had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his digital camera and an officer’s 
warrantless search of the camera violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 122. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
 123. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.2(e). 
 124. See id. 
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use of thermal imagers from a public street, pointed at a private house, 
constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.125 
Further, the Court held that using “sense-enhancing technology” to 
obtain information that could not otherwise have been obtained 
without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected space is a 
search, as long as the sense-enhancing technology is “not in general 
public use.”126 As a result, Kyllo appears to endorse the proposition 
that the reasonable expectation of privacy—and, by extension, the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment—will shift as certain devices 
become more commonplace.127  
Kyllo’s caveat about technology “not in general public use” has 
been the subject of criticism.128 Due to the onward march of 
technology, critics worry that as technology becomes more widely 
used and available, the protections the Court sought to extend in Kyllo 
will vanish.129 In cases of DNA testing, contemporary technology and 
the privacy of the body intersect, and for many years, Katz’s two-part 
rule—establishing protections for subjective exceptions of privacy 
that are objectively reasonable—has been employed to examine the 
expectations of privacy related to one’s body.130 
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: DNA Testing  
The Court has relied upon the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test to determine whether the collection of urine and DNA for 
chemical analysis constitutes a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment.131 In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
 
 125. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 126. Id.  
 127. See Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth 
Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo’s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 
86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2002). 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 1395 (“[T]he general use exception will eventually swallow the 
Court’s newly minted prohibition of technologically enhanced investigation.”). 
However, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in State v. Worsham, 227 So. 
3d 602, 605–06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017), letting stand a Florida appellate court 
decision that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data contained in a 
vehicle’s “event data recorder.” See Florida v. Worsham, 138 S. Ct. 264 (2017) 
(denying certiorari). 
 130. LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.1(b) (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 383 (1974)) (“Katz 
‘has rapidly become the basis of a new formula of Fourth Amendment coverage.’”). 
 131. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 633 (1989) 
(holding that a mandated urine testing of employees was a search governed by the 
 Pacemakers, Fitbits, and the Fourth Amendment 527 
Association, the Court held that mandated urine testing of railway 
personnel did constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because the collection and testing of urine implicated 
objective societal expectations of privacy.132 Similarly, collection of 
DNA from an arrestee has been upheld as a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether the DNA collection’s 
purpose was to investigate a specific crime or to create a general police 
data bank for use in solving future crimes.133 
However, the question of whether the Fourth Amendment 
governs the collection of DNA inadvertently shed by a person is more 
fraught.134 It appears that shed DNA does not retain the protection of 
the person once it is separated from the person.135 In Williamson v. 
State, the defendant was given a McDonald’s meal while waiting to 
be booked at the police station.136 After finishing his meal, the 
defendant discarded his cup and wrappers on the floor of the cell.137 
After he left the cell, officers entered and collected the cup, which they 
then submitted for a DNA test.138 The DNA test yielded a match with 
evidence from prior sexual assaults.139 Relying on the two-prong test 
from Justice Harlan’s Katz concurrence, the court held that analyzing 
the DNA from the McDonald’s cup was not a search because the 
 
Fourth Amendment and the search was reasonable under the special needs doctrine); 
Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that a urine test was a 
lawful search incident to arrest and threats by police officers to forcibly use a catheter 
if defendant did not voluntarily produce a urine sample did not deprive defendant of 
due process); State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 233 (Minn. 2016) (holding that a 
warrantless urine test does not fall within the search-incident-to-arrest exception to 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement). 
 132. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 (“[I]t is clear that the collection and testing of 
urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as 
reasonable.”). 
 133. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 5.4(c); see also Maryland v. King, 133 S. 
Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013) (holding that the warrantless swab of an arrestee’s mouth for 
DNA evidence was a lawful search incident to arrest).  
 134. Mike Silvestri, Comment, Naturally Shed DNA: The Fourth Amendment 
Implications in the Trail of Intimate Information We All Cannot Help but Leave 
Behind, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 165, 184 (2011) (“Naturally shed DNA, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, clearly presents a unique challenge for courts.”).  
 135. See Ferguson, supra note 13, at 594. 
 136. See Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626, 630 (Md. 2010). 
 137. See id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
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defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in what he had 
abandoned or voluntarily discarded.140  
Unlike the defendant in Williamson, who was under arrest at the 
time of DNA collection, Raynor v. State addressed shed DNA 
collection from a suspect not under arrest.141 Raynor voluntarily came 
to the police station for an interview after he was accused of sexual 
assault.142 During his conversation with police, Raynor was asked to 
consent to a DNA test, to which he declined.143 Raynor was wearing a 
t-shirt, and immediately after the interview an officer swabbed the 
arms of the chair where Raynor had been sitting and obtained a DNA 
sample.144 Raynor conceded that the seizure of his DNA was lawful 
under the Fourth Amendment because he had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy concerning what he left behind on his chair.145 
However, Raynor argued that the search of his DNA by police 
required and lacked Fourth Amendment justification separate from the 
seizure of his DNA.146 The court disagreed147 and held that Raynor had 
no objective expectation of privacy in his DNA, in part because the 
police officers had only tested regions of the DNA strand that 
implicated Raynor’s unique identity—not the areas of the DNA strand 
that carry “intimate genetic information.”148  
Similarly, in United States v. Davis, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed the warrantless extraction of DNA from a suspect’s 
clothing when the suspect was not under arrest.149 The Fourth Circuit 
 
 140. See id. at 634; see also United States v. Cox, 428 F.2d 683, 687–88 (7th 
Cir. 1970) (holding that an inmate had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hair 
that he voluntarily discarded after a haircut in prison); Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 
N.E.2d 341, 356–57 (Mass. 2007) (holding that no search or seizure occurred when 
police analyzed the DNA on cigarette butts and a water bottle left behind in an 
interrogation room). 
 141. See Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 754 (Md. 2014), cert. denied 135 S. 
Ct. 1509 (2015). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id.  
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 754–55. 
 146. See id.  
 147. See id. at 759. “[W]e hold that law enforcement’s analysis of . . . 
petitioner’s DNA left behind on the chair at the police station, in order to determine a 
match with the DNA the police collected from the scene of the rape, was not a search, 
as that term is employed in Fourth Amendment parlance.” Id.  
 148. See id. at 761. “[T]he character of the information specifically sought and 
obtained from the DNA testing . . . is paramount in assessing the objective 
reasonableness of his asserted privacy interest.” Id. 
 149. See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 251 (4th Cir. 2012).  
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held that such extraction was a search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.150 Years before he became a suspect himself, Davis was 
the victim of an unrelated shooting, and an officer collected his pants 
and boxers as evidence from Davis’s hospital room—without a 
warrant or Davis’s express permission.151 The court held that the 
seizure of Davis’s clothing was justified under the plain view 
exception, and Davis’s expectation of privacy in his DNA was not 
implicated simply by cataloging the clothing as evidence.152 Davis’s 
clothing then sat in an evidence locker for four years.153 Four years 
after Davis’s shooting, a detective investigating a separate incident 
suspected Davis’s involvement in a murder; the detective learned that 
a local police department had Davis’s clothes and obtained the 
clothing without a warrant.154 The detective was able to extract Davis’s 
DNA from the bloodstain on his pants, and though the DNA sample 
was not useful for the detective’s immediate purposes, it was entered 
into a local police DNA database where it was ultimately matched to 
a separate crime.155 Davis challenged both the extraction of the DNA 
profile from his clothing and the subsequent retention of his DNA 
profile in the police database as violations of his Fourth Amendment 
rights.156 
The Fourth Circuit held that the extraction of Davis’s DNA 
profile from his clothing was an unreasonable search under the Fourth 
Amendment and assumed—without deciding—that there was a 
separate Fourth Amendment violation when his DNA profile was 
retained in the local database.157 The court began its analysis with the 
threshold question of whether the removal of the DNA from Davis’s 
pants constituted a search and concluded that it did.158 The court 
reasoned that the extraction of DNA from Davis’s pants was a search 
because Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his DNA on 
the clothing.159 In its holding, the court emphasized the type of analysis 
 
 150. See id. (holding that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, but the 
exclusionary rule did not apply due to the good faith exception). 
 151. See id. at 230. 
 152. See id. at 239. 
 153. See id. at 231. 
 154. See id.  
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 232. 
 157. See id. at 232–33. But see State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27, 31 (Wash. 2007) 
(affirming the conviction of a suspect who, prior to arrest, had been tricked into 
mailing a letter with his saliva on it to the police). 
 158. See Davis, 690 F.3d at 244.  
 159. See id. 
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that was conducted on the clothing and what potential information that 
analysis may reveal.160 Unlike, for example, examining a piece of 
clothing for paint chips that match the paint from a crime scene, the 
analysis of biological samples can reveal private medical 
information.161 The court also distinguished Davis’s situation from 
those of individuals whose DNA is routinely collected after their 
arrest, incarceration, or parole, holding that a victim retains a greater 
privacy interest.162 As a member of the public, Davis may reasonably 
have a greater expectation of privacy, unlike those whom the 
government has a greater interest in monitoring.163  
Thus, due to the nature of the DNA analysis and Davis’s status 
as a victim when his clothing came into police custody, the court 
concluded that Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
DNA at the time it was extracted for analysis.164 Since Davis had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his DNA, the extraction and 
analysis constituted a search under the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.165 The court further held that the search of Davis’s DNA 
was unreasonable in part due to its arbitrariness.166 In contrast with the 
“programmatic nature” of the routine collection of DNA from 
arrestees or parolees, the search of Davis’s DNA was conducted solely 
due to police suspicions that amounted to less than probable cause.167 
As a result, the search of Davis’s DNA was a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.168 Expectations of privacy arise not only from social 
norms surrounding the privacy of one’s body and genetic information 
but also from social norms surrounding the privacy of information that 
is shared, which is the heart of the third-party doctrine.169  
 
 160. Id. at 244 (“[W]e . . . must consider the type of analysis conducted on that 
clothing to determine whether Davis retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his DNA on the clothing, or in the DNA profile obtained from it.”). 
 161. See id.  
 162. Id. at 246 (“[A] victim retains a privacy interest in his or her DNA 
material, even if it is lawfully in police custody.”). As of 2012, at least twenty-eight 
states enacted laws authorizing the collection of DNA from individuals following 
arrest or charging. David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA 
and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1095–96 (2013). 
 163. See Davis, 690 F.3d at 245 (discussing how the court held that Davis had 
a greater expectation of privacy than an individual whose “proven conduct 
substantially heightens the government’s interest in monitoring them”). 
 164. See id. at 246. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. at 249–50. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 250. 
 169. See LAFAVE, supra note 67, § 2.7(c). 
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2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The Third-Party Doctrine 
The third-party doctrine stems from the Court’s assertion in Katz 
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect “[w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public,” even when that exposure occurs in 
one’s own home or office.170 In essence, the third-party doctrine states 
that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information 
that they voluntarily give to third parties.171 As a result, law 
enforcement is able to utilize information that was released to a third 
party without probable cause or a warrant because the activity at issue 
is not a search and therefore is not governed by the Fourth 
Amendment.172 For instance, the Court in California v. Greenwood 
held that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in trash that they discard near the curb because the trash is knowingly 
exposed to a third party—in this case, the individuals’ neighbors.173 
The third-party doctrine’s “secrecy model of privacy” has been 
criticized on both legal and practical grounds.174 One legal argument 
is that the secrecy model of privacy improperly limits the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment by reducing privacy to an “all-or-nothing” 
proposition.175 In this way, the third-party doctrine erases the 
distinction between information that is broadcast widely and 
information that is disclosed in a controlled environment, such as 
between a customer and his or her bank.176 Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence in Jones v. United States echoes this argument that 
secrecy should not be a “prerequisite for privacy,” arguing that one 
should not assume the voluntary disclosure of information for a 
 
 170. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 171. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (holding that a 
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers she dials 
in the privacy of her home). But see Klayman v. Obama, 142 F. Supp. 3d 172, 189–
91 (D.D.C. 2015) (challenging metadata collection authorized by the U.S.A. 
PATRIOT Act).  
 172. See Richard M. Thompson II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., The Fourth 
Amendment Third-Party Doctrine 1 (June 5, 2014); see also United States v. Miller, 
425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (holding that bank consumers have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their bank records). United States v. Dorsey applies Miller 
to a defendant’s recorded debit and credit card transactions. No. CR 14-328-CAS, 
2015 WL 847395, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015). 
 173. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).  
 174. Thompson, supra note 172, at 2, 7.  
 175. Id. at 17; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 176. See Thompson, supra note 172, at 17.  
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limited purpose disqualifies that information from receiving Fourth 
Amendment protection.177  
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence also references practical 
difficulties with the third-party doctrine in the digital age.178 As she 
argues, in the course of daily life people reveal a significant amount 
of information about themselves to third parties.179 The text of every 
Google search query is shared with a third party, namely Google itself, 
which also maintains a record of every email sent through their 
servers.180 Third parties also hold data related to online sales 
transactions, social networking interactions, and shared photos with 
geotagged181 locations.182 These advancements in data generation and 
collection, paired with shifts in human interaction, mean that more 
information that previously would have been shielded by the Fourth 
Amendment is no longer protected.183 The practical argument against 
the third-party doctrine also questions whether participation in these 
activities is truly voluntary.184 In other words, use of a cell phone and 
online search queries may become so integrated into modern life that 
it would be unreasonable to require individuals to forego them simply 
to maintain Fourth Amendment protections over their information.185 
Those arguing in support of the third-party doctrine liken the act 
of requesting evidence held by third parties to interviewing a witness 
after a crime.186 In both instances, officers need not obtain a warrant to 
 
 177. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (arguing against 
the assumption that “all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the 
public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection”). 
 178. See id.  
 179. See id.  
 180. See id.  
 181. Geotagging is the process of adding location identification metadata to 
other types of media. See Olga Buchel & Diane Rasmussen Pennington, Geospatial 
Analysis, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MEDIA RESEARCH METHODS 285, 292 
(Luke Sloan & Anabel Quan-Haase eds., 2017). For instance, photos may contain 
embedded geographical information indicating where the photo was taken. See id. 
 182. See Thompson, supra note 172, at 2 n.12; see also David A. Harris, Riley 
v. California and the Beginning of the End for the Third-Party Search Doctrine, 18 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 922 (2016). “The digital world, and the ways in which we 
can collect, store, analyze, and map the ever-growing pile of data produced on each 
of us every day is qualitatively different from what we can observe in the physical 
world.” Id. 
 183. See Thompson, supra note 172, at 2. 
 184. See id. at 18. 
 185. See id. at 18–19.  
 186. See id. at 16. 
 Pacemakers, Fitbits, and the Fourth Amendment 533 
receive assistance from a third party.187 Further, Professor Orin Kerr188 
has argued that the third-party doctrine is an equalizer that allows law 
enforcement the same freedoms to investigate crime in the digital 
world that law enforcement officers enjoy in the natural world.189 Kerr 
likens the metadata collected by third parties to the actions in the 
public square that would be in plain view of law enforcement.190 
Without technology, most crimes involve a public act in a space not 
constitutionally protected, such as purchasing drugs on the street, 
purchasing a weapon, committing sexual assault, or perpetrating other 
violent crimes.191 In these cases, criminals must venture into a public 
space where the Fourth Amendment does not protect them.192 Kerr 
worries that without the third-party doctrine, criminals may be able to 
conceal their activities from law enforcement by employing digital 
technology.193  
Proponents of the third-party doctrine also argue that if the third-
party doctrine is in error, Congress—not the courts—should extend 
protections to information shared with third parties.194 Though 
Congress may not legislatively supersede the Court’s interpretation 
and application of the Constitution, Congress may carve out its own 
role in constraining government surveillance.195 For instance, a 
location-monitoring bill could prohibit companies from sharing a cell 
phone subscriber’s location information unless the government 
 
 187. See id.  
 188. Professor Kerr is a Fourth Amendment scholar currently at the University 
of Southern California (USC) Gould School of Law. See Orin Kerr, USC GOULD SCH. 
L., https://gould.usc.edu/faculty/?id=73523 [https://perma.cc/H383-7W4H] (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2019). Prior to his appointment as a distinguished professor at USC, 
Professor Kerr was a professor of law at George Washington University Law School. 
See id. He has authored numerous books on criminal procedure and his scholarship 
has been cited by more than 3,000 academic articles. See id. 
 189. See Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
561, 575 (2009). “It corrects for the substitution effect of third parties that would 
otherwise allow savvy criminals to substitute a hidden third-party exchange for a 
previously public act.” Id. at 561. 
 190. See id. at 575. 
 191. See id. at 574–75. 
 192. Id. at 575 (“[T]he wrongdoer has to leave his home and go out into spaces 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 193. See id.  
 194. See Thompson, supra note 172, at 26 (quoting Justice Alito that “a 
legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed 
lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way”). 
 195. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (“Congress 
may not legislatively supersede our decisions interpreting and applying the 
Constitution.”); see also Thompson, supra note 172, at 25. 
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produces a warrant or acts under an exception to the warrant 
requirement.196 In fact, Congress has taken a subject-matter-specific 
approach to limiting the third-party doctrine in the past.197 The 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986—passed seven years 
after the Court’s Smith decision applied the third-party doctrine to 
telephone records—contains provisions that require the government to 
seek a court order before using a “pen register” or similar device that 
monitors which telephone number a user has dialed.198 Similarly, the 
Cable Communications Privacy Act of 1984 provides targeted privacy 
protection for cable subscribers, and the Stored Communications Act 
of 1986 establishes privacy requirements for “customer proprietary 
network information.”199 
In addition to these congressional acts, the Supreme Court has 
limited the scope of the third-party doctrine.200 In Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, the Court held that a hospital’s sharing of drug test results 
with police without the patient’s consent constituted an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.201 Ferguson concerned a public 
hospital program that entailed testing obstetric patients for cocaine use 
during pregnancy and after labor and turning over positive test results 
to law enforcement.202 The hospital argued that the drug tests fit into a 
category of “special needs” searches because the aim of the program 
was to protect the health of fetuses and newborns.203 The Court 
disagreed204 and held that given law enforcement’s close involvement 
with the program, the benign motive of protecting the health of mother 
and baby did not justify a departure from Fourth Amendment 
protections.205 While hospital employees may provide police with 
 
 196. See Thompson, supra note 172, at 25. 
 197. See id. 
 198. Id. at 23. However, the language of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act removes discretion from the judge, directing the judge to issue the order 
“if the court finds that the attorney for the Government has certified that the 
information likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012). 
 199. See 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012); 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2012). 
 200. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001). 
 201. See id. at 85. The Court distinguished the hospital’s mother–baby drug 
testing program from other “special needs” searches because “the hospital seeks to 
justify its authority to conduct drug tests and turn the results over to law enforcement 
agents without the knowledge or consent of the patients.” Id. at 77–78. 
 202. See id. at 70–71. 
 203. Id. at 68. 
 204. See id. at 83. “[T]he immediate objective of the searches was to generate 
evidence for law enforcement purposes.” Id.  
 205. See id. at 85. 
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evidence of criminal conduct they routinely acquire in the course of 
treatment, they may not turn over medical records to police without 
the patient’s consent.206 Even though one’s medical records have been 
knowingly disclosed to a third party, the records are exempted from 
the third-party doctrine, and police may not access them without a 
warrant or patient consent.207  
Importantly, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the third-
party doctrine for digital data in Carpenter v. United States.208 In 
Carpenter, law enforcement warrantlessly seized and searched 
historical cell site location information (CSLI) to reveal the 
whereabouts of Timothy Carpenter over the course of seven days.209 
The government obtained an average of 101 data points per day 
regarding Carpenter’s location—painting a picture of his movements 
that the Court described as “encyclopedic.”210 The Court chose to 
analyze the government’s actions under the Katz privacy theory, 
recognizing that digital data held by a third party does not fit neatly 
into existing precedents.211 The Court declined to extend the third-
party doctrine of Smith and Miller to the collection of deeply revealing 
digital data, holding that the government’s collection of historical 
CSLI from Carpenter’s cell phone provider was a Fourth Amendment 
search.212  
In Carpenter, the Court distinguished CSLI from the bank and 
phone records at issue in Smith and Miller: historical CSLI is all-
encompassing, creating numerous data points that are akin to wearing 
an ankle monitor; the “retrospective” quality of the information allows 
 
 206. See id. Justice Sotomayor referenced the Ferguson decision as an 
example of the third-party doctrine’s limitation during oral arguments in Carpenter v. 
United States. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Carpenter v. United States, 137 
S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (No. 16-402).  
 207. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 23; see also Edward 
J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, Data Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. 
L. REV. 413, 435–36 (discussing the Ferguson case within the broader context of the 
third-party doctrine and distinguishing it from Miller).  
 208. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 209. See id. at 2217 n.3 (noting the total amount of data seized by the 
government covered many months, but the Court considered seven days to be the 
pertinent period). “It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven 
days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.” Id.  
 210. See id. at 2209, 2216. 
 211. Id. at 2214–15 (“[R]equests for cell-site records lie at the intersection of 
two lines of cases, both of which inform our understanding of the privacy interests at 
stake.”). 
 212. Id. at 11 (“We decline to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel 
circumstances.”). 
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law enforcement to search backward in time; the personal data can be 
accessed by law enforcement effortlessly, “with just the click of a 
button”; and data is not truly “shared” because the cell phone logs the 
information without any affirmative action on the part of the user.213 
Moreover, the Court emphasized the intimate nature of location 
information, noting that an individual’s movements often reveal one’s 
family, political, religious, and sexual associations.214 However, the 
Court stressed that the Carpenter ruling is a narrow one that applies 
only to historical cell site location records and not, for instance, to real-
time CSLI.215 Looking ahead, the Court acknowledged many difficult 
questions related to personal data and emerging technologies, stating 
“we ‘do not begin to claim all the answers today.’”216 Thus, whether 
the third-party doctrine applies to personal health and medical data is 
a question the Supreme Court has yet to decide.217  
III. PROVIDING HEIGHTENED FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
FOR MEDICAL AND HEALTH TRACKING DEVICES 
Constitutional protections for physical searches of the body were 
not among the Founders’ foremost concerns.218 Underlying this lack of 
concern was the fact that the government could gain little evidence 
from a suspect’s body during this period.219 However, with the growth 
of fingerprinting, DNA evidence, and forensic science, many criminal 
cases in recent decades have turned on evidence closely connected to 
the defendant’s body.220 Today, the recording of health and medical 
data has opened another door for evidence closely connected to the 
human body.221 
 
 213. Id. at 2217–18, 2220, 2223.  
 214. Id. at 2217 (“[T]hese location records ‘hold for many Americans the 
privacies of life.’”). 
 215. Id. at 17 (“Our decision today is a narrow one.”). 
 216. Id. at 2217 n.4. 
 217. See infra Subsection III.B.2 for a discussion of whether the Carpenter 
reasoning would also apply to personal health and medical data that is transmitted to 
a third party.  
 218. See Ferguson, supra note 13, at 590.  
 219. See id. (“[T]he reality [was] that . . . little evidence [could] be gained by 
searching the body in this early era.”). 
 220. See id. at 590–91.  
 221. See supra notes 20–44 and accompanying text (describing the nature and 
extent of data collected by health and medical trackers). 
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The recording of health and medical data presents unique legal 
issues for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.222 Whether the health and 
medical data is stored locally on a device or transmitted to a third-
party server has legal implications for the search or seizure threshold 
question.223 In each instance—whether the data is stored locally or 
transmitted—the application of the Jones trespass theory and the Katz 
privacy theory support enhancing Fourth Amendment protection for 
health and medical data.224 
A. Is It a Search? The Threshold Question for Local Data 
Data recorded by health and medical trackers is first stored 
locally on the device itself.225 At that point, accessing the memory of 
the device is required to access the data.226 Later, either through 
automatic transmission or patient-initiated transmission, the data is 
typically sent to third parties for storage on their server.227 After 
transmission, anyone who has access to the third-party data bank may 
view the data, such as a medical professional who reviews the data 
before a patient appointment or a consumer who logs in to compare 
his or her health statistics from month to month.228 This process of 
local storage followed by transmission creates two distinct moments 
 
 222. Ferguson, supra note 13, at 590–91 (“[Q]uestions about data trails from 
the human body raise fascinating constitutional issues.”). 
 223. This is because the Court has held there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy when data is “knowingly exposed” to a third party. See, e.g., Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (holding that a person does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in phone numbers she dials in the privacy of her home). See 
infra Section III.A for an analysis of locally stored data and see infra Section III.B for 
an analysis of transmitted data. 
 224. See generally United States v. Jones 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967). See also infra Subsection III.A.1 for an analysis 
of local data under the trespass theory and Subsection III.B.1 for an analysis of 
transmitted data under the trespass theory. See infra Subsection III.A.2 for an analysis 
of local data under the privacy theory and Subsection III.B.2 for an analysis of 
transmitted data under the privacy theory. 
 225. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (describing how health 
and medical devices store and transmit data). 
 226. See, e.g., FITBIT, supra note 49 (describing how certain consumer devices 
store data locally). 
 227. See, e.g., FDA Safety Notice, supra note 31 (describing a cybersecurity 
vulnerability in a specific cardiac device and its accompanying transmitter). 
 228. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text (describing ways medical 
professionals and consumers can access the recorded data). 
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for Fourth Amendment analysis, depending on where the data is 
housed.229 
1. Local Storage: Threshold Analysis Under the Trespass Theory  
Under the Jones test, the government conducts a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it physically intrudes into 
a constitutionally protected area for the purpose of gathering 
information.230 In Jones, the Court recognized a suspect’s vehicle as a 
constitutionally protected area—an “effect” in the language of the 
Fourth Amendment drafters.231 In Grady, the case concerning GPS 
monitoring of sex offenders, the Court recognized the body as a 
constitutionally protected area—a “person” in the language of the 
Fourth Amendment.232 Medical and health devices combine elements 
of both “effects” and “persons.”233 Often, these devices are effects that 
are placed on people’s bodies or even implanted inside their bodies.234 
Using the Jones and Grady precedents, the government’s physical 
intrusion into a medical or health device located on or in one’s body 
in order to gain information would likely constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.235  
However, physical intrusion, such as connecting a cable to the 
device, is not always needed to access the data stored locally.236 For 
instance, in the Compton arson investigation, the investigators 
wirelessly collected data stored locally on Compton’s pacemaker, 
 
 229. Data transmission, which is a form of information sharing, typically 
implicates the third-party doctrine. See Brief for the United States at 14–15, Carpenter 
v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2206. 
 230. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012). 
 231. See id. at 404. 
 232. See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 (2015). 
 233. See supra notes 30–44 and accompanying text (detailing how some 
devices, such as a pacemaker, are physically implanted into the body while others, 
such as a FitBit, are removable accessories). 
 234. Cochlear implants and pacemakers as examples of implanted devices, 
whereas Fitbits and Ava bracelets as examples of wearable devices. See supra notes 
27–44 and accompanying text. 
 235. See Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370 (holding that forcing an individual to wear 
a GPS-monitoring ankle bracelet constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (holding that 
a police officer may not warrantlessly search an arrestee’s cell phone as part of a 
lawful search incident to arrest). 
 236. See, e.g., A Bluetooth-Enabled Pacemaker Provides Flexibility to 
Patients, supra note 48 (explaining the Bluetooth-enabled pacemaker provided by 
Cone Health Medical Group). 
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requiring Compton only to sit in the room and “give [them] his time” 
while a machine downloaded the information.237 Since Jones involved 
investigators physically touching the suspect’s vehicle, and Grady 
involved court officials physically placing a GPS monitor on a sex 
offender, the Court has not yet ruled on an instance where the 
government initiates a wireless intrusion on an individual’s body or 
effect.238  
However, the Court’s 2001 Kyllo decision did address a 
nonphysical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area: a 
suspect’s home.239 In Kyllo, the Court held that a Fourth Amendment 
search need not entail a physical intrusion; aiming a thermal imager at 
a house from a public street was sufficient to bring the police conduct 
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.240 Since the government, 
not the suspect, is initiating the transfer of information in these 
instances, the data would not be covered by the third-party doctrine.241  
In contemporary society, physical contact is not needed to 
transfer information.242 Whether the government needs to plug a cord 
into a medical device to download data or can accomplish the transfer 
wirelessly should not determine the scope of a suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment protections.243 In other words, a suspect’s constitutional 
 
 237. See Wootson, supra note 5 (describing the investigator’s tactics). 
 238. See Grady, 135 S. Ct. at 1370 (holding that a physical attachment is a 
search); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410 (2012) (ruling that the 
physical trespass constituted a search). 
 239. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (ruling that technology 
that allows officers to obtain information about activity inside a home is a search). 
Note the Kyllo Court decided that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred based 
on the reasonable expectation of privacy theory, rather than the trespass theory. See 
id. at 34–35 (discussing Katz without any reference to physical trespass). 
 240. See id. (discussing why the officer’s activity was a violation of privacy). 
The Court held that a search occurs when officers use “sense-enhancing technology” 
that is not in general public use to gain information not otherwise available to the 
public. Id. at 34. 
 241. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (noting that any 
information that individuals release to others is not protected by the Fourth 
amendment).  
 242. See The Global Standard for Connection, BLUETOOTH TECH., 
https://www.bluetooth.com/bluetooth-technology [https://perma.cc/82YP-LQGC] 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2019). AirDrop is another example of a product that allows users 
to wirelessly send data from one device to another. See Use AirDrop on Your Mac, 
APPLE SUPPORT, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203106 [https://perma.cc/ 
7AZC-HCH2] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (discussing technology that allows Apple 
users to wirelessly share information with each other). 
 243. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (emphasizing the flexibility of the privacy test). 
In Kyllo, officers used new technology to avoid a physical intrusion of the suspect’s 
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protection should not hinge on a tangential design feature of his or her 
device.244 To maintain consistency, the government should not be able 
to initiate the download of local data, either wirelessly or via physical 
intrusion, without a warrant or the suspect’s consent.245 Thus, wireless 
or physical access of local data on a suspect’s medical device should 
receive Fourth Amendment protection under the physical intrusion 
theory.246  
2. Local Storage: Threshold Analysis Under the Privacy      
Theory  
The Katz decision laid out a two-prong privacy test to determine 
whether a search has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment: first, whether the person exhibited a subjective 
expectation of privacy, and second, whether that expectation is one 
that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.247 Assuming that an 
individual exhibits an actual, subjective expectation of privacy 
regarding the data stored locally on his or her medical or health device, 
the analysis centers on whether his or her expectation of privacy is 
reasonable.248 Health and medical data that is “shed” and then recorded 
 
house, but the Court held that a Fourth Amendment search had still occurred. See id. 
at 34–35 (noting that a thermal imaging device that allowed officers to read heat 
signatures from a home was a search).  
 244. Rather, courts have looked to the quantity and quality of the data stored 
as determinative factors for Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Riley v. 
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (requiring a warrant to search a cell 
phone incident to arrest due to the quantity and quality of information stored in cell 
phones); State v. Worsham, 227 So. 3d 602, 604, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) 
(holding that “[a] car’s black box is analogous to other electronic storage devices for 
which courts have recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy” because of the 
nature of the information contained within them).  
 245. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495 (requiring police to obtain a warrant 
before searching cell phones due to the highly personal data that is stored on them). 
 246. See Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (holding that 
remote GPS monitoring of a convicted sex offender constituted a search under the 
trespass theory). 
 247. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (describing the privacy theory test of whether a Fourth amendment search 
has occurred). 
 248. Id. (“[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited 
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).  
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by a device on one’s body shares similarities with urine collection and 
the collection of inadvertently shed DNA.249  
In Ferguson, the Court held that obstetric patients have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the urine that they submit for drug 
screening, even though the urine is technically waste produced by the 
body.250 Elsewhere, the Court has held that the collection of biological 
samples such as urine that do not involve any intrusion into the body 
are nonetheless searches because they intrude upon expectations of 
privacy related to medical information and the act of urination that 
“society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”251 Thus, to the extent 
medical and health tracking devices record private biological data, the 
information recorded by these devices should be extended heightened 
Fourth Amendment protection.252 
The Court has used the Katz privacy test to also analyze whether 
the warrantless collection of DNA constitutes a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.253 While routine DNA collection is well 
established for convicted persons and arrestees, lower courts have 
been split on the constitutionality of collecting inadvertently shed 
DNA from individuals not under arrest.254 In these circumstances, 
DNA may be collected from things like the seat of a suspect’s chair, 
an inadvertently shed hair, or other biological material found on 
clothing in police custody.255 Again, the shedding of DNA by the 
individual is inadvertent and thus is not a knowing exposure subject 
to the third-party doctrine.256 Like skin cells or hair left behind on an 
interview chair, data about people’s bodies is continuously “shed” 
 
 249. See generally Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The 
Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 857 (2006) (describing 
how DNA is continuously discarded by the body). 
 250. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 68, 76 (2001) (“[T]he urine 
tests conducted by those staff members were indisputably searches within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 251. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989). 
 252. See id. at 616–17 (explaining that urination is a private biological 
function protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
 253. See supra Subsection II.B.1 (describing applications of the Katz privacy 
test to urine collection and shed DNA). 
 254. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 251 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 754, 755 (Md. 2014); see also Angelique Romero, 
Comment, Implications of United States v. Jones on DNA Collection from Arrestees: 
A Trespass Prohibited by the Fourth Amendment?, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 244, 245 
(2013). 
 255. See, e.g., Davis, 690 F.3d at 251; Raynor, 99 A.3d at 754. 
 256. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
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throughout the day without their awareness.257 Fourth Amendment 
scholar Andrew Guthrie Ferguson describes this shed data as a “data 
trail” that is created when an individual interacts with sensor 
surveillance throughout his or her day.258 Once the medical and health 
devices begin recording, people are constantly shedding this data.259  
Health and medical device data is also similar to DNA data in 
that both are inherently personal.260 The Fourth Circuit in Davis 
emphasized the personal nature of DNA when ruling that Davis had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his DNA found on clothing that 
was lawfully in police custody.261 The Davis Court contrasted the 
collection of DNA from clothing lawfully in police custody with the 
collection and analysis of paint chips found on clothing lawfully in 
police custody.262 Unlike paint chips, individuals retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their DNA, which can reveal “physiological 
data” and “a host of . . . medical facts.”263 It is precisely these privacy 
interests that are implicated in data held by medical and health 
tracking devices.264 Like DNA, the data from these devices can reveal 
physiological information about one’s health or wellbeing, such as 
whether someone is complying with medical treatment or the 
progression of a disease.265  
The Davis decision contrasts with the decision in Raynor.266 In 
Raynor, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the DNA testing 
of biological material left by a suspect on an interview chair was not 
 
 257. Dick Warrington, Touch DNA, FORENSIC MAG. (Dec. 27, 2010), 
https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2010/12/touch-dna [https://perma.cc/E8JC-
3MZL] (“Because we are constantly shedding skin cells, when we touch something, 
we leave skin cells behind. Even if suspects leave only 6–8 skin cells from the 
outermost layer of their skin, scientists can use those cells to develop a DNA 
profile.”). 
 258. See Ferguson, supra note 13, at 558–60. Ferguson develops a theory of 
“informational curtilage” to evaluate which data trails deserve Fourth Amendment 
protection. See id. at 619. 
 259. Joh, supra note 249, at 858 (“We leave traces—skin, saliva, hair, and 
blood—of our genetic identity nearly everywhere we go.”). 
 260. See id. at 876–77 (describing the sensitive nature of DNA and medical 
information, particularly in connection with “behavioral genetics”). 
 261. See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 262. See id. at 244. 
 263. Id. at 243. 
 264. See supra Section I.B (detailing the medical facts collected by 
pacemakers, insulin pumps, Fitbits, and other devices). 
 265. See Appelboom et. al, supra note 20, at 3 (describing the physiological 
information made available by remote monitoring devices). 
 266. See Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 759 (Md. 2014). 
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a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.267 In so 
holding, the Raynor Court emphasized that the process used by law 
enforcement essentially turned the suspect’s DNA into an 
identification number and did not reveal any intimate health or 
medical information.268 In contrast, the data collected from medical 
devices is, by definition, associated with known medical or health 
conditions.269 When police officers search medical and health devices 
for information, they are not merely trying to identify the subject, but 
rather they are trying to gain knowledge about that individual’s 
activities, habits, or movements.270 Therefore, the Maryland Court’s 
reasoning for rejecting Raynor’s argument does not apply in the case 
of medical and health device data.271 For this reason, like the medical 
information stored within one’s DNA, individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for medical and health data stored locally on 
their devices.272 As such, this data should receive Fourth Amendment 
protections under the privacy theory.273 Thus, a government search of 
locally stored medical or health data will implicate the Fourth 
Amendment whether the court’s analysis is done under the trespass 
theory or the reasonable expectation of privacy theory.274  
B. Is It a Search? The Threshold Question for Transmitted Data 
Many health and medical tracking devices transmit the 
individual’s locally stored data to a third-party hosting service.275 Once 
 
 267. See id. at 82, 85 (holding that because police officers did not test regions 
of the DNA strand that carried “intimate genetic information,” the DNA test was not 
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
 268. See id. at 86. 
 269. See Appelboom et. al, supra note 20, at 3 (describing clinical applications 
for medical and health tracking devices). 
 270. See Jackson, supra note 62 (describing ways in which law enforcement 
uses digital data in criminal investigations).  
 271. See Raynor, 99 A.3d at 761 (reasoning that Raynor had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his DNA because medically sensitive areas of his DNA were 
not tested). 
 272. See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 243 (4th Cir. 2012); see also 
State v. Worsham, 227 So. 3d 602, 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that car 
owners have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal driving data stored in 
their vehicle’s “black box” or “event data recorder” and that a warrantless search of 
an impounded car’s black box violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 273. See Worsham, 227 So. 3d at 604. 
 274. See supra Subsection III.A.1 (analyzing locally stored data using the 
Jones trespass theory). 
 275. See Bailey, supra note 29, at 889; see also FDA Safety Notice, supra note 
31; A Bluetooth-Enabled Pacemaker Provides Flexibility to Patients, supra note 48; 
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the data is on the server, third parties, such as physicians, may access 
the data and view it in aggregate to identify patterns in activity or 
behavior.276 The patient or user may initiate transmission manually, 
like when he or she opens the Fitbit application, or the data may be 
uploaded continuously throughout the day.277 Traditionally, the Court 
has understood this type of data transmission to fall squarely within 
the third-party doctrine; however, recent arguments by Justice 
Gorsuch may show a way forward for a “data as property” view.278  
1. Transmitted Data: Threshold Analysis Under the Trespass 
Theory  
For a Fourth Amendment violation to occur under the trespass 
theory, the government must intrude upon a constitutionally protected 
area in order to gather information without a warrant or the party’s 
consent.279 Typically, these constitutionally protected areas have been 
understood as the areas outlined in the Fourth Amendment text itself: 
persons, houses, papers, and effects.280 In other words, the areas in 
which the suspect has a property interest receive Fourth Amendment 
protection.281 If, however, one’s data could be construed as one’s 
property, defendants could use the Jones trespass test to trigger Fourth 
Amendment protection.282 Under this understanding, one’s data, no 
matter where it is stored, receives Fourth Amendment protection under 
the property view.283  
Justice Gorsuch raised this issue during oral arguments for 
Carpenter v. United States.284 Justice Gorsuch inquired whether if a 
 
FITBIT, supra note 49 (identifying how certain medical and health tracking data is 
transmitted to a third-party server). 
 276. See, e.g., A Bluetooth-Enabled Pacemaker Provides Flexibility to 
Patients, supra note 48 (explaining the Bluetooth-enabled pacemaker provided by 
Cone Health Medical Group).  
 277. See generally FITBIT, supra note 49. 
 278. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976) (holding the 
government acquisition of an individual’s personal bank records does not constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 279. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 407 (2012). 
 280. See, e.g., LAFAVRE, supra note 67, § 2.3. “Prior to the decision in Katz v. 
United States, the Supreme Court often used the concept of a ‘constitutionally 
protected area’ to define the reach of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Id. 
 281. See id. § 2.1(e). 
 282. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05 (“[T]he text of the Fourth Amendment reflects 
its close connection to property . . . .”). 
 283. See id. at 404. 
 284. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 38. 
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thief were to break into a T-Mobile store and steal consumer-location 
data, planning to profit from it, customers whose data was stolen 
would have a tort claim for conversion.285 If so, and if consumers were 
recognized as having a property right in their data, a similar 
acquisition of consumer-location data by law enforcement would 
constitute a search under the property theory recognized in Jones.286 
During this exchange with Justice Gorsuch, government counsel 
argued that a property interest has never been recognized in 
information that is transferred to a business or a third party.287 Justice 
Alito expressed support for the government’s position.288 In doing so, 
Justice Alito distinguished cell phone location data from property 
because the individual did not ask the cell phone company to create it, 
nor could the person force the cell phone company to destroy it.289 
Ultimately, Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch each authored a 
separate dissent to the Carpenter decision.290 Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch both argued that the Court should abandon the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test and the accompanying third-party doctrine 
in favor of a property-based approach.291 
Federal statute does establish some rights to one’s personal data 
for a cell phone consumer like Timothy Carpenter.292 The Stored 
Communications Act of 1986 establishes privacy requirements for 
“customer proprietary [network] information.”293 Under that statute, a 
customer has the right to block or order the disclosure of his or her 
 
 285. See id. at 38, 52. 
 286. See id. at 52. Justice Gorsuch asked, “Wouldn’t that, therefore, be a 
search of my paper or effect under the property-based approach approved and 
reminded us in Jones?” Id.; see also Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch’s Independent 
Streak, SLATE (Nov. 30, 2017, 2:52 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/11/in-carpenter-v-united-states-neil-gorsuch-
showed-his-independent-streak.html [https://perma.cc/5NV3-LE2V]. 
 287. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 55. Counsel for the 
United States argued that such a property right would “resemble no property right 
that’s existed.” Id. But see James Madison, Property, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 598, 598 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“In its larger 
and juster meaning, [property] embraces every thing to which a man may attach a 
value and have a right; and which leaves to every one else the like advantage.”). 
 288. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 55–56. 
 289. See id.  
 290. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2235 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); id. at 2206 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2261 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 291. Id. at 2235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This case should not turn on 
‘whether’ a search occurred. . . . It should turn, instead, on whose property was 
searched.”); see also id. at 2261–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 292. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 222 (2012). 
 293. See id. § 222(c)(1). 
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digital records from a telecommunications company.294 A defendant 
may argue that by passing the Stored Communications Act, Congress 
was beginning to recognize the intersection of consumers’ property 
and privacy interests in the digital age.295 Federal law provides 
protection for consumer records, but it extends greater protection for 
the contents of an individual’s communication.296 If the Court 
interprets these statutes as creating a customer proprietary interest in 
his or her digital data, then the Fourth Amendment will require a 
corollary protection from unreasonable searches and seizures of that 
data under the Jones property test.297  
State tort laws also have recognized a proprietary interest in 
certain types of digital data, upholding conversion as a cause of action 
that applies to intangible property such as electronic records.298 Under 
New York law, the types of property subject to conversion claims are 
tangible personal property and intangible property that bears a 
substantial similarity to tangible property, such as electronically stored 
information.299 However, the laws of conversion in New York do not 
protect fully intangible “property,” such as a business opportunity or 
the right to benefits under a contract.300 Similarly, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has held that under 
Illinois law a satellite television company may have a conversion 
claim against an individual who used a satellite descrambler to 
intercept satellite television without the company’s authorization.301 
 
 294. Id. § 222(c)(2) (“A telecommunications carrier shall disclose customer 
proprietary network information, upon affirmative written request by the customer, to 
any person designated by the customer.”). 
 295. In fact, Carpenter argued that, since it was last amended when only nine 
percent of Americans had cell phones, the Stored Communications Act provides little 
guidance on the issue of Fourth Amendment protections for cell site location data. 
Brief for Petitioner at 50, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2017) (No. 16-402). 
 296. See Claudia G. Catalano, Annotation, Prohibited Voluntary Disclosure 
Under Stored Communications Act, 9 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 6 (2016); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2702 (2012).  
 297. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 56–57. Justice 
Gorsuch asked rhetorically, “[T]he government can acknowledge a property right but 
then strip it of any Fourth Amendment Protection. Is that the government’s position?” 
Id. 
 298. See Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1277–78 
(N.Y. 2007).  
 299. See In re Abreu, 527 B.R. 570, 587 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 300. See id. 
 301. See Directv, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 
2004).  
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The Seventh Circuit also remarked in dicta that there is no reason why 
intangible property might not be susceptible to conversion.302 
Advancing the property theory of Fourth Amendment protection 
would require the Court to recognize a legally cognizable proprietary 
interest in the health and medical data that is created by people’s 
bodies.303 Personal health and medical data is analogous to the satellite 
television data at issue in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, in that the party 
with the proprietary interest creates the health and medical data.304 
Unlike cell phone location data, in which the cell phone company 
creates a record of the user’s location based on which cell tower the 
user’s phone “pings,”305 informational content of health and medical 
data is created by the users themselves and exists before it is shared 
with a third party.306 In other words, if one has a proprietary interest in 
the medical and health data that one’s body creates, that proprietary 
interest may be recognized by the Fourth Amendment trespass 
theory.307 
 
 302. FMC Corp. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 915 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(quoting WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, Chapter 3, in PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW 
OF TORTS 92 (1984)) (“[T]here is perhaps no very valid and essential reason why there 
might not be conversion of intangible property.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Laura D. Mruk, WiFi Signals Capable of Conversion: The Case for 
Comprehensive Conversion in Illinois, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 348 (2008) (arguing 
that using another individual’s wireless internet signal meets the elements of 
conversion under Illinois law). 
 303. In other words, the Court would need to recognize the data from our 
bodies as a constitutionally protected area, not unlike it held the body itself to be a 
constitutionally protected area in Grady v. North Carolina. See 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1370 
(2015).  
 304. Directv, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (“[F]or purposes of conversion, it 
is not the intent to steal or pilfer property that matters, but rather an intent to exercise 
a dominion or control over the goods which is in fact inconsistent with the plaintiff’s 
rights.”). 
 305. Amy Howe, Justices to Tackle Cell Phone Data Case Next Term, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2017, 12:52 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/ 
justices-tackle-cellphone-data-case-next-term [https://perma.cc/32BL-8BNT] 
(“[H]istorical cell-site records . . . . indicate the cell towers with which a cellphone 
connected while it was in use.”). 
 306. For instance, the device automatically records a Fitbit user’s sleep 
patterns; the data is generated by the user’s heart rate and movements throughout the 
night, recorded on the Fitbit device, then wirelessly transmitted to the Fitbit app. See 
How Do I Track My Sleep With My Fitbit Device?, FITBIT, 
https://help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/1314 [https://perma.cc/7QR5-
SYXK] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019).  
 307. This proprietary interest would be similar to the interest recognized by 
Directv, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1064. 
548 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
2. Transmitted Data: Threshold Analysis Under the Privacy 
Theory  
For an individual’s data to receive Fourth Amendment 
protection under the Katz privacy theory, the individual must exhibit 
a subjective expectation of privacy; furthermore, this expectation must 
be one that society recognizes as reasonable.308 The third-party 
doctrine, as applied in United States v. Miller and Smith v. United 
States, holds that when an individual reveals private information to a 
third party, he or she forfeits any Fourth Amendment protections to 
that data.309 In other words, the Court has found it unreasonable to 
expect privacy after knowingly revealing one’s information to a third 
party.310  
At first glance, the knowing transmission of private health or 
medical data to a third party seems to fit squarely within the third-
party doctrine.311 However, the third-party doctrine has never been 
absolute.312 Congress has acted statutorily to limit the application of 
the third-party doctrine, and the Court has also exempted certain types 
of information from the third-party doctrine.313 For instance, in 
Ferguson the Court held that obstetric patients retain a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the results of urine samples voluntarily 
submitted for testing, and hospital staff may not reveal the outcome of 
those tests to law enforcement without the patient’s consent.314  
More importantly, the Supreme Court’s recent Carpenter 
decision applies the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine to a 
new type of internet metadata, cell site location information.315 In 
Carpenter, the Court held that the historical personal location 
information held by a consumer’s cell phone service provider was not 
subject to the third-party doctrine, and therefore accessing the data 
 
 308. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
 309. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 310. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
 311. See, e.g., Miller, 425 U.S. at 440 (holding that a bank customer has no 
protectable Fourth Amendment interest in bank records knowingly shared with her 
financial institution). 
 312. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (holding 
that obstetric patients have a protectable Fourth Amendment interest in urine samples 
they knowingly gave to hospital staff for testing). 
 313. See id.; see also Thompson, supra note 172, at 23–25 (providing 
examples of congressional limitations on the third-party doctrine).  
 314. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84. 
 315. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
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constituted a Fourth Amendment search.316 The Court emphasized the 
narrowness of the Carpenter decision, and it did not address other 
forms of personal internet metadata, such as health and medical 
information.317 However, the reasoning the Court used to exempt cell 
site location information (CSLI) from the third-party doctrine would 
likely apply to personal health and medical data as well.318 For 
instance, both CSLI and health or medical data create many data points 
throughout the day, giving law enforcement a unique window into the 
user’s minute-to-minute routine.319 In addition, just as cell phone use 
is a nearly indispensable part of modern life, health or medical devices 
may be recommended or required by the user’s physician, meaning 
that the data is not voluntarily exposed in the same way personal 
banking data is voluntarily exposed to the user’s bank.320 In a 
forthcoming work that synthesizes the Carpenter reasoning, legal 
scholar Orin Kerr proposes that personal internet records should 
receive Fourth Amendment protection when (1) the collection of the 
information is only made possible by surveillance methods of the 
digital age, (2) the digital records are not the product of a user’s 
meaningful voluntary choice, and (3) the records are of a type that tend 
to reveal an intimate portrait of a person’s life.321  
Arguing that the third-party doctrine should apply to health and 
medical data, the government may rely on case law upholding the 
third-party doctrine for credit or debit card data which tells where and 
when a user shops and the amount of his or her purchases.322 This 
credit card transaction data, which can track the nature and amount of 
one’s expenses, subscriptions, and location, is no more or less private 
than health and medical data, the government may argue.323 However, 
 
 316. See id. at 2217. The Carpenter opinion limits its holding to the statement 
that accessing seven days of historical cell site location data constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search. See id. at 2217 n.3. 
 317. See id. at 2220 (“Our decision today is a narrow one.”). 
 318. See id. at 2216–19. 
 319. See id. at 2216 (describing CSLI as “detailed, encyclopedic, and 
effortlessly compiled”). 
 320. Id. at 2220 (“Neither does the second rationale underlying the third-party 
doctrine—voluntary exposure—hold up when it comes to CSLI. Cell phone location 
information is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.”).  
 321. See Orin S. Kerr, Implementing Carpenter 3 (Dec. 18, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript). 
 322. See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, No. CR 14-328-CAS, 2015 WL 
847395, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2015) (applying Miller to a defendant’s recorded 
debit and credit card transactions). 
 323. Justice Alito raised this argument during the Carpenter oral arguments. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 4–5. 
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personal medical and health data is distinguished from credit and debit 
card data in at least three ways. First, American society has 
demonstrated a heightened expectation of privacy related to medical 
and health information.324 Second, the number of data points collected 
by a period of medical and health monitoring are often greater than the 
number of data points yielded by credit card information.325 And 
finally, credit card transactions are more voluntary than medical 
devices, which some patients may rely upon to sustain their lives.326  
In analyzing whether a search violates the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court must consider the social norms governing reasonable 
expectations of privacy.327 The social norms around health and medical 
information indicate that American society has heightened 
expectations of privacy for this information.328 One manifestation of 
this heightened expectation of privacy is the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), which created 
an offense for sharing individually identifiable health information 
with a third party.329 Congress passed HIPAA with the goal of 
protecting patient privacy, and in the years following the passage of 
HIPAA, President Bill Clinton issued an executive order further 
protecting patient confidentiality in the course of government 
business.330  
 
 324. See supra Section I.C (describing American social norms surrounding 
personal medical and health information). 
 325. See FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE PAYMENTS STUDY 2016, 
2–4 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/2016-payments-
study-20161222.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFB5-KWLN] (discussing trends in consumer 
debit and credit card use and identifying the volume of data points collected by credit 
and debit card transactions each year in the United States). 
 326. See generally Stiles, supra note 30 (observing that pacemaker patients 
with remote monitoring have a greater likelihood of survival).  
 327. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (explaining that in 
each instance, the court must consider “our societal understanding that certain areas 
deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion”). 
 328. See supra Section I.C (detailing programs such as HIPAA as evidence 
for heightened social norms protecting the privacy of health and medical information). 
 329. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012). 
 330. See Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996, H. R. 
Rep. No. 104-496, at 100 (1996) (stating in committee report that “[p]rotecting the 
privacy of individuals is paramount”); see also To Protect the Privacy of Protected 
Health Information in Oversight Investigations, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,321, 81,321 (Dec. 
26, 2000) (stating that the government “may not use protected health information 
concerning an individual that is discovered during the course of health oversight 
activities for unrelated civil, administrative, or criminal investigations of a non-health 
oversight matter”). 
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The American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics 
provides additional evidence of heightened social norms surrounding 
the privacy of medical and health information.331 The Code describes 
patient privacy as a core health care value and essential to establishing 
trust in the patient–provider relationship.332 Furthermore, rules of 
evidence that protect communications between a physician and 
patient, and the congressional defense of these rules, provide further 
evidence of such social norms.333 Taken together, HIPAA, the 
American Medical Association’s Code of Ethics, and the protections 
of patient–physician privilege illustrate that medical and health 
information are among the areas that deserve “the most scrupulous 
protection from government invasion.”334 
Personal health and medical data also differ from daily debit and 
credit card data in the number of data points recorded.335 A Fitbit 
device records thousands of steps each day for the user, and an 
integrated GPS tracker can identify the user’s location every minute 
of the day.336 In contrast, debit card users conduct an average of 23.6 
transactions per month.337 So, although a record of debit card 
transactions may identify a user’s location once or twice per day, the 
volume of location data recorded by debit cards is significantly less 
than the volume recorded by medical and health trackers.338 In the past, 
the Court has looked to the volume of data collected to determine 
whether the Fourth Amendment may have been triggered, finding that 
the more data yielded by a government activity, the greater the 
likelihood that the government activity will be a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.339 Therefore, the quantity of data 
 
 331. See AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 3.1.1 (2016) 
 332. See id.  
 333. Graham & Murphy, supra note 78, § 5521. 
 334. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
 335. See supra Section I.A (describing the volume of data collected by 
personal medical and health trackers). 
 336. See FITBIT, supra note 49. 
 337. Since the 2008 recession, debit card transactions have outpaced credit 
card transactions for daily consumer use. See generally FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 
325. In 2016, debit card issuer Pulse reported that the number of transactions per 
active card user reached 23.6 per month, a record high. PULSE Study: Debit Fraud 
Loss Rates Decline After Chip Cards Introduced, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 14, 2017, 2:50 
PM) [hereinafter PULSE Study], https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 
20170814005875/en/PULSE-Study-Debit-Fraud-Loss-Rates-Decline [https://perma. 
cc/8SUW-FP7U]. 
 338. See PULSE Study, supra note 337. 
 339. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (holding that the 
government may not search a cell phone as part of a lawful search incident to arrest, 
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collected by health and medical devices distinguishes them from credit 
and debit card transactions, weighing in favor of exempting health and 
medical data from the third-party doctrine.340 
Personal medical and health data is also distinguished by the 
degree of voluntariness with which some users employ the devices.341 
Typically, a consumer who wishes to keep a particular financial 
transaction private may, with minimal inconvenience, use cash or 
money order.342 In contrast, some users of medical tracking devices 
rely on them for serious medical conditions.343 For instance, Ross 
Compton, the Ohio man whose pacemaker data was used against him 
in an arson investigation, likely relied upon his pacemaker for 
lifesaving medical support.344 Users who are told by their doctors that 
they need these devices for critical medical problems have their data 
recorded with far less voluntariness than a debit card user or even a 
cell phone user.345 Thus, medical and health data is further 
distinguished from the financial data at issue in Miller.346 Since 
medical and health data is significantly different than the information 
at issue in the classic third-party doctrine cases of Smith and Miller, 
the Court should carve out an exception to the third-party doctrine for 
medical and health information, just as it did with the obstetric 
patients’ drug test results in Ferguson.347 
 
and noting that “cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from 
other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person”); United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 403 (2012) (noting that the GPS device placed on the defendant’s vehicle 
“relayed more than 2,000 pages of data over the 4-week period”).  
 340. See FITBIT, supra note 49 (describing the continual monitoring provided 
by the device); PULSE Study, supra note 337. (describing the average number of debit 
card transaction per user per month).  
 341. See Section I.A (describing how some medical device trackers are 
necessary to maintain a patient’s health or wellbeing). 
 342. See Justin Pritchard, Money Order Basics: Tips for Payments, BALANCE, 
https://www.thebalance.com/money-order-basics-315432 [https://perma.cc/5ZSL-
CLCX] (last updated Oct. 30, 2018).  
 343. See Stiles, supra note 30 (noting that pacemaker patients with high 
remote monitoring use had a fifty-three percent greater survival rate than patients with 
low remote monitoring use). 
 344. Ross Compton had numerous medical problems and was generally in 
poor health. See Johnson, supra note 2. 
 345. See Stiles, supra note 30.  
 346. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 439–40 (1976) (holding that 
bank customers did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records held by 
their financial institutions). 
 347. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001) (holding 
that urine samples obstetric patients knowingly gave to hospital staff for testing were 
exempt from the third-party doctrine). 
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CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia wrote in Kyllo v. United States that “in the sanctity 
of the home, all details are intimate details.”348 Similarly, within the 
sanctity of the human body, all details are intimate details.349 It is 
precisely these details—such as the speed of one’s heartbeat and the 
length of one’s stride—that medical and health technologies capture 
and record.350 The intimacy of these details and their value to law 
enforcement illustrate why the courts should afford this data Fourth 
Amendment protections.351 When the data is stored locally on a device 
worn on or in the person’s body, the Court should provide protections 
for this data that is coextensive with the protections provided to 
individual’s bodies themselves, regardless of whether a physical 
intrusion is necessary to access the local data or whether it may be 
accessed wirelessly.352 When the data is transmitted to a remote server 
for monitoring, the Court should carve out an exception to the third-
party doctrine that protects the privacy of this data even when it is 
disclosed to a third party.353 In so doing, the Court will align itself with 
the reasonable expectations of privacy for these devices and protect 
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